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Abstract
The relationship between security and citizenship is more complex than media portrayals based 
on binary oppositions seem to suggest (included/excluded, security/insecurity), or mainstream 
approaches to International Relations (IR) and security seem to acknowledge. This is particularly 
the case in the post-imperial and/or postcolonial contexts of global South where the transition 
of people from subjecthood to citizenship is better understood as a process of in/securing. For, 
people were secured domestically as they became citizens with access to a regime of rights and 
duties. People were also secured internationally as citizens of newly independent ‘nation-states’ 
who were protected against interventions and/or ‘indirect rule’ by the (European) International 
Society, whose practices were often justified on grounds of the former’s ‘failings’ in meeting the 
so-called ‘standards of civilization’. Yet, people were also rendered insecure as they sought to 
approximate and/or resist the citizen imaginaries of the newly established ‘nation-states’. The 
article illustrates this argument by looking at the case of Turkey in the early Republican era 
(1923–1946).
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Introduction
The relationship between security and citizenship is more complex than media portrayals 
based on binary oppositions seem to suggest (included/excluded, security/insecurity), 
or mainstream approaches to International Relations (IR) and security seem to acknowl-
edge (insecurity originates from outside the state boundaries, and states provide security 
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for ‘individuals qua citizens’).1 On the one hand, access to citizenship rights has brought 
betterment to peoples’ lives, regardless of however relative such betterment has proven 
to be. Throughout the twentieth century, individuals and social groups constituted their 
agency as they struggled to gain citizenship rights. On the other hand, citizens continued 
to experience insecurities even after the transition from subjecthood to citizenship.
The relationship between security and citizenship is particularly complicated in the 
post-imperial2 and/or postcolonial contexts of global South.3 In such contexts, the transi-
tion of individuals and social groups from subjecthood to citizenship is better understood 
as a process of in/securing – that is, neither as a moment of security, as official state 
discourses proclaim, nor as a process of insecuring, as their critics contend. We use the 
term ‘in/securing’ to underscore the reflexivity of security, that is, the ways in which our 
practices produce ‘insecurity’ as well as ‘security’ for ourselves and for others.4 We 
understand ‘security’ as ‘the condition of being and feeling safe’,5 and ‘insecurity’ in 
terms of both specific and/or military threats and non-specific and/or non-military 
threats.6
As part of the process of transition from subjecthood to citizenship, people in the 
global South were secured domestically since they no longer were imperial and/or colo-
nial subjects, but citizens with access to a regime of rights and duties. People were also 
secured internationally as citizens of newly independent ‘nation-states’ who were pro-
tected against interventions and/or ‘indirect rule’ by members of the (European) 
International Society, whose practices were often justified on grounds of the former’s 
‘failings’ in meeting the so-called ‘standards of civilization’. Yet, people were also ren-
dered insecure as they sought to approximate and/or resist the citizen imaginaries of the 
newly established ‘nation-states’. Those who did not fit the ‘model citizen’ mould of the 
new ‘nation-states’ experienced myriad insecurities.7 Security guarantees introduced as 
part of the citizenship regimes of the ‘nation-states’ usually coexisted with insecurities 
generated as part of the dynamics of transition processes, or by the institutional and idea-
tional legacies of imperialism and/or colonialism.8
In offering this argument, we build on a notion of ‘postcoloniality’ understood ‘as 
a subjectivity of oppositionality to imperializing/colonializing (read: subordinating/
subjectivizing) discourses and practices’ and ‘not so much subjectivity “after” the 
colonial experience’.9 By adopting such a broad notion of ‘postcoloniality’, we seek 
to underscore the relevance of the insights of Postcolonial Studies in understanding 
the insecurities of not only those who were colonized but also others who were caught 
within the material and non-material structures of colonialism or imperialism.
For, even in those parts of the world that did not experience colonization, inquiring 
into the ‘postcolonial anxieties’ of the elite10 is likely to offer important insights. A case 
in hand is the so-called ‘standards of civilization’.11 During the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the ‘standards of civilization’ set by the (European) International 
Society12 were utilized by the European great powers in managing their relations with 
‘non-Europe’ (as with the imposition of unequal treaties, indirect rule and/or League of 
Nations mandate regimes). These ‘standards’ allowed the European great powers to reg-
ulate their relations with ‘non-Europeans’, usurp raw materials and open up markets for 
their products and services.13 The European great powers’ practices as such left their 
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mark on not only those who were colonized but also other ‘non-Europeans’ whose rela-
tions with ‘Europe’ were shaped by these ‘standards’.14
As an illustration, we look at the early Republican period in Turkey (1923–1946).15 
Turkey may come across as a curious choice to illustrate our argument. The Republic of 
Turkey was established in 1923, following a war of national liberation that was fought in 
resistance to the Sèvres Treaty of 1918, which was designed to carve out the Ottoman 
Empire in the aftermath of World War I. Turkey narrowly escaped dismemberment and, 
unlike some other post-Ottoman territories, evaded the imposition of the League of 
Nations mandate.16 Western-oriented since its founding,17 Turkey joined the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952, and became a European Community associated 
country in 1963. Finally, yet importantly, Turkey carries its own imperial baggage vis- 
a-vis other post-Ottoman peoples.18 In other words, Turkey does not come across as a 
‘typical’ case to illustrate insecurities in the global South. Yet, as we suggest below, 
considering the insecurities of Turkey’s early Republican elite offers insights into the 
complex relationship between citizenship and in/security in the global South.19
Relatively few scholars have thus far drawn upon Postcolonial Studies to study the 
Ottoman Empire and Turkey. Building on Deringil’s research on late Ottoman postcolo-
nial anxieties,20 we suggest that adopting postcolonial lenses provide fresh insight into 
the practices of Turkey’s early Republican leaders who inherited these anxieties. For, 
while the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 had affirmed Turkey’s sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity, the early Republican leaders were nevertheless concerned about the 
fragility of such recognition against the background of the (European) International 
Society’s ambivalence towards the Ottoman ‘difference’. The Ottoman Empire was a 
multi-ethnic body organized around communities of faith (the so-called Millet system). 
In the absence of a citizenship regime, the European great powers voiced their scepticism 
about the Ottomans’ ability to govern non-Muslim communities in general and Christian 
peoples in particular. Turkey’s early Republican leaders were met with similar expres-
sions of scepticism (see below) in their early encounters with the International Society. 
Arguably, their quest for a unified body politic and creating a ‘nation-state’ was as much 
a product of their ideas and ideals21 as it was a part of the attempt to meet the ‘standards 
of civilization’ of the International Society.22
Consider, for instance, how Turkey’s early Republican leaders framed their efforts 
directed towards creating a ‘nation-state’ in ‘civilizational’ terms. In a speech delivered 
on the 10th Anniversary of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) described the 
Republican leadership’s goals in the following manner:
We will raise our country to the level of the most developed and most civilized countries. We 
will make our nation have the means and sources of utmost prosperity. We will raise our 
national culture above the contemporary civilization.23
Rather than rejecting the discourse of ‘standards of civilization’ that temporalized dif-
ference and spatialized time (see below), the Republican leaders sought to locate Turkey 
in this ‘civilization’. Yet at the same time, the very ‘civilization’ they sought to locate 
Turkey in was represented as a source of insecurity. In a text no less significant than 
Turkey’s national anthem, which was adopted during the war of national liberation, the 
 at Bilkent University on May 29, 2015ire.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
4 International Relations 
European great powers are referred to as the ‘single-fanged monster you call civiliza-
tion’.24 Our point being, given Turkey’s early Republican leaders’ ambivalence vis-a-vis 
‘Europe’, and the anxieties they shared with the postcolonial, there are potential insights 
to be gained from adopting postcolonial lenses in studying Turkey’s case.
Section titled ‘From subjecthood to citizenship: a process of in/securing’ introduces 
our twofold argument. First, we suggest that individuals’ transition from subjecthood to 
citizenship in the post-imperial and/or postcolonial contexts of the global South should 
be understood less as a moment of security, or as producing mostly insecurity, but a pro-
cess of in/securing.25 Second, we suggest that processes of transition from subjecthood 
to citizenship in such contexts cannot be captured by focusing on the domestic dynamics 
alone, but should be studied by locating those dynamics in the international context. 
Here, we refine the ‘included’ v. ‘excluded’ binary by offering the category of ‘included/
excluded’ in reference to those citizens who were insecured by virtue of their late access 
to some citizenship rights and/or their lack of sense of empowerment in exercising those 
rights. Section titled ‘Rethinking the literature on citizenship in Turkey’ locates our argu-
ment vis-a-vis the literature on citizenship in Turkey, which offers rich micro-accounts 
that are yet to be brought together to offer a macro-account on all citizens’ experiences 
of in/security. The following section looks at Turkey’s ‘included/excluded’ citizens’ 
experiences of in/security during the period under consideration. We discuss the govern-
mental efforts directed at territorializing the country and introducing civic education 
courses in primary and secondary schools. Section titled ‘Turkey’s “Model Citizens”: 
Searching for “Ontological Security”?’ considers the ‘ontological insecurity’ of Turkey’s 
‘model citizens’ who were not excluded from access to citizenship rights, but were 
nevertheless rendered insecure as they became increasingly less able to live with ‘differ-
ence’. Here, we focus on the infamous ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaign of the late 
1920s and early 1930s.
From subjecthood to citizenship: a process of in/securing
Students of critical theorizing about International Relations and security26 have challenged 
the assumptions that states unfailingly provide security to their citizens and that 
insecurity originates from non-citizens.27 They have also challenged the presumption 
that states primarily (if not exclusively) have responsibilities towards their own 
citizens.28 Somewhat more recently, such critique has become central to debates in 
critical theorizing on border security, surveillance and immigrants.29 The insecurities 
experienced by citizens have also been examined in the Citizenship Studies literature, 
which has looked at the exclusionary and discriminatory practices of states,30 and the 
Political Geography literature on the ‘whereness of citizenship’.31 There is also the 
Postcolonial Studies scholarship, which has considered insecurities of the postcolo-
nial.32 The argument here builds on the insights of these four bodies of literature and 
focuses on the relationship between security and citizenship in the global South.
The institution of citizenship regimes against the background of decaying empires 
and/or colonial regimes is rightly viewed as a moment of celebration. However, such 
processes of transition from subjecthood to citizenship are also riddled with insecurities. 
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This is the case not only for those who are excluded from the citizenship regimes of 
newly established states but also for those who are not. One such instance of in/securing 
can be found in the early experiences of the United States, as analysed by Marston:
Although citizenship has been a conceptual foundation in the building of the American state, it 
is a category of status whose historical (and contemporary) access has been mediated through 
deep-seated prejudices, such as racism and sexism, and moulded by strongly held beliefs about 
the ‘natural’ roles of men and ‘others’.33
Among others, women’s experiences in different parts of the world has shown that the 
removal of legal barriers is only a necessary first step – important but not enough in itself 
so long as other barriers remain and/or are instituted in the transitory process.34 Indeed, 
as Secor underscored, over the years:
the discourse and practice of citizenship [has universalised] the particular constellation of 
dominant positions (such as maleness, bourgeois status, or identification with the titular ethnic 
or racial group) that is occupied by ‘the citizen’, defining those identities that are not 
encompassed within the seemingly neutral category as particularistic and therefore properly 
excluded from expression within the public sphere.35
Hence, Sibley maintained that ‘apart from examining legal systems and the practices 
of social control agencies, explanations of exclusion require an account of barriers, 
prohibitions and constraints on activities, from the point of view of the excluded’.36
Our analyses need not stop at examining exclusionary practices, cautioned Sibley, but 
consider all practices of citizenship. This is because, he argued:
[a] study of exclusion … is necessarily concerned with inclusion, with the ‘normal’ as much as 
the ‘deviant’, the ‘same’ as well as the ‘other’ and with the credentials required to gain entry to 
the dominant groups in society.37
To this end, we offer a threefold categorization: (1) those who are ‘excluded’ from the 
citizenship regimes of ‘nation-states’, (2) those ‘model citizens’ who are ‘included’ by 
agreeing to approximate the citizen imaginary, and (3) those who are ‘included/excluded’ 
due to their resistance or late/r access to citizenship rights, or a lack of sense of empower-
ment in exercising those rights.38 This threefold categorization allows us to study the 
multiple ways in which citizens are in/secured as they seek to approximate or resist the 
citizen imaginary of ‘nation-states’.
We further suggest that processes of transition from subjecthood to citizenship in the 
global South could be better understood when located in their international context. In 
offering this argument, we build upon Hindess’ analysis of citizenship as a ‘conspiracy 
against the rest of the world’.39 Citizenship is a ‘conspiracy’, Hindess argued, by virtue of:
bringing together members of particular subpopulations and promoting some of their interests, 
but also … rendering the larger population governable by dividing it into subpopulations 
consisting of the citizens of discrete, politically independent and competing states.40
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While this ‘conspiracy’ has taken the form of an ‘international system of population 
management’41 in Western Europe and North America, it has unfolded differently in the 
global South.42
In the global South, the dynamics of the ‘conspiracy’ have historically been condi-
tioned by the global disparities in power/knowledge and anxieties generated by the 
temporalization of difference and spatialization of time. The temporalizing of difference 
relegated ‘peoples and ways of life to the status of anachronisms’ by virtue of their 
differences.43 The spatializing of time involved representing some parts of the world as 
belonging to the past.44 Many in the global South were introduced to citizenship as part 
of their struggles against Orientalism’s ‘geographical violence’.45 During the age of 
colonialism, the European great powers pointed to the absence of notions and institu-
tions citizenship in some parts of the world as a moral, intellectual and institutional 
failure and portrayed such ‘failures’ as evincing their inability to self-govern in a 
‘civilized’ manner.46 It was based on such apparent ‘failings’ of some in meeting the 
‘standards of civilization’ that the members of the (European) International Society justi-
fied the need for colonial rule in some places, differentiated treatment of peoples under 
International Law in other places and/or the need for reform in some other places.47
Following decolonization, those who used to be on the receiving end of such practices 
sought to build their own ‘nation-states’ and mould the former subject peoples in their 
image of ‘model citizen’.48 Of the citizens of the newly established ‘nation-states’, both 
those who sought to resist and those who sought to approximate the new citizen imaginary 
were in/secured – albeit in different ways. Our intention here is not to underplay the 
significance of the emancipatory dimension of such processes. Nor do we mean to trivial-
ize the ideas and ideals of the intellectuals in the global South. Rather, we underscore the 
international context in which their agency is constituted. In offering this argument, our 
aim is to understand the ways in which the policy-makers’ practices of citizenship in the 
global South produce security and insecurity for the citizens as they respond to (and 
shape) domestic and international dynamics.49
Rethinking the literature on citizenship in Turkey
There has now evolved a substantial body of literature on citizenship in Turkey, detailing the 
predicament of those who were ‘excluded’ through the population exchange of 1923 (the 
Mübadele) whereby the Greek Orthodox Christians from Turkey left for Greece, and 
the Muslims from Greece came to Turkey.50 The discriminatory practices experienced by 
those who became citizens of the Republic are also examined in rich micro-accounts on the 
Kurds,51 the Alevi,52 and the minorities as defined in the Treaty of Lausanne.53 In what 
follows, we present an overview of the literature by grouping existing studies into two 
accounts: those who consider the citizenship regime of the Republic as a moment of security 
for all; and those see it as a process of insecuring of some.
In the literature on citizenship in Turkey, those who consider the 1924 Constitution54 
as marking a moment of security base their argument on the following definition of citi-
zenship as found in Article No.88: ‘The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and 
race, are Turkish in terms of citizenship’.55 The 1924 Constitution could indeed be 
viewed as having laid the foundations of an inclusive citizenship regime by recognizing 
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the ‘minority’ status of the Greek Orthodox,56 Jewish and Armenian Orthodox peoples.57 
This first account acknowledges that, in time, there emerged a gap between what the 
1924 Constitution laid down on paper and the citizenship practices of the state.58 
Nevertheless, the first account explains away this gap as an effect of the aberrations of 
some bureaucrats. Put differently, the first account takes the founding texts of the 
Republic at face value, and views the insecurities experienced by some citizens as excep-
tions to an otherwise inclusive citizenship regime.
The first account also credits the Republic’s citizenship regime for having instituted a 
notion of citizenship as found in other ‘civilized’ countries. As such, these authors seem 
to situate the efforts of the early Republican leaders vis-a-vis the international context. 
They nevertheless underplay the challenging nature of the international context of this 
period and the postcolonial anxieties of Turkey’s policy-makers. Yet, the domestic dis-
courses of Turkey’s Republican elite indicate that such anxieties were not far from their 
thoughts. For instance, the minutes of the debates on the adoption of the (Swiss) civil code 
in Turkey (which also meant the secularization of the civil code) include references to the 
risk of intervention by European great powers on behalf of the minorities unless the civil 
code was secularized.59 Our point being that the first account fails to appreciate how the 
1924 Constitution helped to secure the citizens of the Republic of Turkey against those 
members of the (European) International Society who did not hesitate to express their 
doubts regarding Turkey’s capacity to govern its populace in a ‘civilized’ manner.60
The second account offers an important corrective by laying bare the ways in which 
the early Republican citizenship regime was a far cry from being the moment of security 
it is portrayed to be by the first account. It was a process of insecuring of some, argue 
these authors, pointing to an exclusionary pattern in the citizenship practices of this era.61 
Such practices included the withholding of women’s political rights until 1934,62 barring 
non-Turkish speakers from government and private sector jobs for many years,63 subject-
ing minority citizens to discriminatory treatment in war-time taxation and conscription64 
and the settling of immigrants and citizens in line with statist security concerns.65
While providing immensely valuable micro-accounts on the experiences of insecu-
rity by various aspects of Turkey’s citizenry, the second account has focused on the 
domestic struggles and overlooked the international. Consequently, the first account 
has not considered the multiple ways in which all citizens were secured and insecured 
vis-a-vis domestic and international threats during this period. In the absence of such 
a macro-account bringing together these micro-accounts, we do not have a comprehen-
sive understanding of the complex relationship between security and citizenship in 
Turkey in the early Republican era.
We submit that in Turkey, as in other global South contexts, the transition of individu-
als and social groups from subjecthood to citizenship is better understood as a process of 
in/securing. Our argument deviates from the first account that views the transition as 
marking a moment of security for all. It is also different from the second account that 
considers the transition as a process of insecuring for some. We suggest that, on the one 
hand, the new Republic’s citizenship imaginary and practices of citizenship secured 
Turkey’s people as citizens of an independent and sovereign ‘nation-state’. No longer 
were they subjects of an Empire; nor did they face the danger of being subjected to the 
indirect rule or mandate administration by the European great powers due to their 
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failings in meeting the ‘standards of civilization’. On the other hand, people were also 
rendered insecure by the Republic’s citizen imaginary. For, only those who choose (and/
or were able) to approximate the citizen imaginary (i.e. the ‘included’) exercised full citi-
zenship rights. Turkey’s ‘included/excluded’ citizens did not always feel capable or 
empowered to make use of rights that were available to them on paper. Furthermore, as 
evinced by the infamous ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaign (see section titled ‘Turkey’s 
“Model Citizens”: Searching for “Ontological Security”?’), even the ‘included’ were 
insecured as they became less able to live with ‘difference’.
Turkey’s ‘Included/Excluded’ citizens
The 1923 Mübadele (population exchange) marked the beginning of the process of in/
securing in the new Republic. Those people we referred to as the ‘excluded’ were 
exchanged with Greece in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty.66 The population 
exchange was designed by the Norwegian diplomat Fridtjof Nansen, the League of 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and was lauded by the (European) 
International Society as guaranteeing the protection of minorities towards preventing 
future conflicts.67 In 1922, Nansen received the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions 
to the repatriation and asylum search for the refugees fleeing the war in Russia and Asia 
Minor. Constructing an ‘“unmixed” Near East’ was the central goal of his mission to 
Greece and Turkey.68 The point being that the ‘excluded’ were products of not only 
the citizenship imaginary of the new ‘nation-state’ in Turkey but also the minority and 
conflict regulation practices of the (European) International Society.
Insecurities of those who were subjected to the population exchange of 1923 are well 
documented in the academic literature as well as popular culture – as with the following 
poem by Papa Neofitos Ekonomos (1925):
İsmet Pasha and Venizelos came
They decided on a bargain
When doing this did they ask any man?
We’d not seen the like since the world began
They expelled us from Turkey
Tears flowed like blood from all our eyes.69
This and the following sections (‘Turkey’s “Included/Excluded” citizens’ and 
‘Turkey’s “Model Citizens”: Searching for “Ontological Security”?’) look at the ways in 
which those who were not excluded from the new Republic’s citizenship regime were in/
secured. The next section discusses the ‘ontological security’ of Turkey’s ‘model citi-
zens’ (the ‘included’) and the roles they played in the infamous ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ 
campaigns. This section is concerned with the predicament of the non-Muslim minorities 
and others who sought to resist the ‘ideal’ citizen mould (‘included/excluded’). Whereas 
the Lausanne Treaty recognized the ‘minority’ status of the former, the latter’s claim to 
minority status and/rights (as with the Kurds) was not recognized.70 We chose to focus 
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on two governmental practices that touched the lives of large numbers of people: namely, 
the territorialization of Turkey and the establishment of civic education courses in pri-
mary and secondary schools.
Territorializing Turkey
During this era, the practices of territorialization adopted by Turkey’s early Republican 
leaders included the passing of various laws governing who would be allowed to immi-
grate to Turkey and where the citizens would settle, erasing the remnants and memories 
of the past inhabitants through settling the immigrants in places vacated by the Armenian 
and Rum Orthodox subjects of the former Ottoman Empire and the changing of place 
names throughout Anatolia.
Subjecting the citizens to state-directed movement and settlement measures turned 
out to be one of the most far-reaching aspects of the practices of in/security of this era. 
During these years, the Ankara governments passed two settlement laws governing who 
can immigrate to Turkey and become a citizen, and where the new citizens would be 
allowed to settle. In 1926, the Law on Settlement No. 885 was adopted.71 This law 
remained in effect until the more extensive Law on Settlement No. 2510 was codified in 
1934.72
Article No. 2 of the 1926 Law of Settlement addressed the newly arriving immigrants 
and stated that people who did not belong to the ‘Turkish culture’ could not be admitted 
as immigrants or refugees. While Turkish language skills were apparently prioritized in 
defining the boundaries of the ‘Turkish culture’, Turkey’s Republican leaders nevertheless 
allowed religious and/or ethnic factors to shape their practices.73 The Turkish-speaking 
immigrants were mostly directed to settle in places where they were expected to help 
with diluting the non-Turkish speaking population. The non-Turkish-speaking immigrants, 
in turn, were settled in places that would help with their integration. One exception 
to this practice was the settlement of the Turkish-speaking immigrants in ‘security- 
sensitive’ areas (as with Eastern Thrace, on Turkey’s border with Greece and Bulgaria).
The Law on Settlement No. 2510 was less about settling newly arriving immigrants 
as it was about re-settling non-Turkish speaking and non-Muslim citizens of the Republic. 
Article No. 2 read:
Turkey is divided into three settlement zones: zone 1 are the areas deemed to be where the 
population of the Turkish culture is dense … zone 2 are the areas separated for the migration 
and settlement of the population deemed to be assimilated into the Turkish culture … zone 3 are 
the areas where settlement is prohibited owing to reasons related to health, economy, culture, 
politics, the military and security.74
Whereas Turkish language apparently constituted a key component of the ‘Turkish 
culture’ as operationalized by the 1926 law, the 1934 law put emphasis on ‘lifestyle’. 
Article No. 10 of the 1934 law targeted the lifestyle of the nomads in general and the 
Kurds in particular and abolished all of the previously documented and recognized rights 
of the tribal chiefdoms and sheikhdoms.75 By way of dividing the country into three 
zones and re-settling the citizens based on their proximity to the ‘Turkish culture’, the 
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1934 law sought, to quote the Grand National Assembly (GNA) lawmakers, to ‘create a 
country speaking with one language, thinking in the same way and sharing the same 
sentiment’.76
Accompanying the two settlement laws were practices that sought to territorialize 
Turkey by allowing the newly settled citizens to convert the material culture in their 
places of settlement. The literature on the spatial practices of the early Republican period 
has mostly focused on the ways on which the new Republic sought to shape the body 
politic through shaping a new architectural culture.77 However, shaping a unified body of 
citizens may also involve violence directed against the material culture. The evidence of 
past coexistence and heterogeneity may be (directly) destroyed or (indirectly) allowed to 
decay through the targeting of elements of the material culture, as with architectural 
symbols or the urban fabric of cities.78 Indeed, Turkey’s early Republican leaders chose 
to settle the immigrants in places vacated by the Armenian and Greek Orthodox subjects 
of the former Ottoman Empire, thereby giving these re-populated places a makeover. In 
the process, the remnants of the past inhabitants were erased and the memories of those 
who were left behind were hurt.79
Another aspect of the practices adopted during this period was the changing of place 
names. During the war of national liberation, place names were changed mostly for 
emotive reasons, as with the newly liberated towns wishing to reclaim the space.80 The 
changing of place names became a feature of Republican leaders’ practices only after 
the breakup of the Kurdish rebellions in southeastern Anatolia. From the mid-1920s 
onwards, the practice of renaming was not limited to Greek or Armenian place names 
but also encompassed those in Arabic and Kurdish as well.81
To summarize, the desire to create a unified citizen body through managing the flow 
of immigrants and their areas of settlement was unmistakable during this period. The 
settlement practices of the state were not isolated to the immigrants but also involved 
those citizens who had failed, until then, to approximate the new Republic’s citizen 
imaginary. For instance, the ‘model citizen’ image of the Republic was imposed on the 
peoples who were brought up in a nomadic lifestyle. Such imposition of a settled life-
style, while allowing for provisioning peoples in terms of access to health services and 
education (security), at the same time rendered apparent the limits of recognition of and 
respect for (linguistic and lifestyle) difference in the new Republic’s citizen imaginary 
(insecurity).82
The civic education courses in primary and secondary schools
In Turkey, as in other places, the nation-state ‘[was] inscripted in official documents, 
histories and journalistic commentaries, among other texts – in ways that impose coher-
ence on what is instead a series of fragmentary and arbitrary conditions of historical 
assemblage’.83 In early Republican Turkey, practices to this effect included the propaga-
tion of the so-called Turkish History thesis,84 the language reform that involved the 
transition from Arabic to Latin alphabet and ridding Turkish of Arabic and Persian 
words and the changing of peoples’ surnames into Turkish. The most emblematic of 
them all for our purposes was the introduction of a compulsory civic education course 
in the primary and secondary schools. Since this course served the purpose of introducing, 
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justifying and cementing all of the other cultural practices, this section of the article will 
focus on the civic education course.85
The name of the civic education course was Yurt Bilgisi (Homeland Knowledge). The 
course textbook86 was authored by Afet İnan, the historian and adopted daughter of Mustafa 
Kemal (Atatürk).87 While other textbooks were also produced during this period,88 we will 
focus on the İnan textbook, for its story as well as content help illustrate the Republican 
leaders’ efforts to mould Turkey’s peoples in their image of ‘model citizens’.
The 1931 textbook’s notion of citizenship was a ‘civic republican’ one, defining 
citizenship within the parameters of solidarism and community.89 Whereas the ‘liberal’ 
definition of citizenship casts citizenship as a status involving rights accorded to 
citizens, the ‘civic republican’ definition casts it as a practice involving responsibilities 
to the wider society.90 As with some other ‘nation-states’ of the time, Turkey’s citizenry 
was ‘regarded as, at best, an eventually educable ward and, at worst, someone prone to 
derail the national journey with his irrational and provincial proclivities’.91
Given the course’s objective of fashioning ‘civilized’ and ‘modern’ citizens, who 
would be ‘obedient’ to the Republic,92 the textbook put more emphasis on the duties and 
obligations of citizens towards the state, and less on citizens’ rights. İnan later explained 
such de-emphasis on citizens’ rights with reference to Mustafa Kemal’s thinking that 
every right should be complemented by a duty.93 The need to tilt the rights/duties balance 
towards the latter was formulated previously by the Ottoman intellectual Ziya Gökalp 
who cautioned:
Do not say ‘I have rights’;
There is only duty, not right.
A sociologist by training, Gökalp’s ideas shaped the thinking of early Republican 
leaders even after his untimely death in 1924.94 The Republican People’s Party’s motto 
of this era, ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’,95 was also inscribed into the students’ 
worldview through the civic education textbook. The text’s emphasis on fashioning a 
unified citizen body of ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’ translated into a less than 
accepting attitude towards all those who fell short of approximating the Republic’s citi-
zen imaginary. Regarding the non-Turkish speakers, the textbook said:
In the current political and social unity of the Turkish nation, some of our citizens are being 
encouraged to adopt a Kurdish, Circassian, Laz or Bosnian identity, but these misnomers, 
which are remnants of an autocratic period from the past, have caused nothing but misery 
among these individuals, with the exception of a backward and brainless few. For these 
members of the nation also share the same common past, history, ethics and law.96
To recapitulate, in the early Republican period, peoples of myriad origins could 
choose to be ‘included’. The ticket of entry was exhibiting willingness to approximate 
the Republic’s citizen imaginary as detailed in the civic education textbook. Such will-
ingness was to be exhibited through not drawing attention to (if not forgetting) one’s 
ethnic/religious/sectarian difference/s.97 The narrative of the civic education textbook ren-
dered ‘backward’ all those who failed or refused to approximate the citizen imaginary.
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Thus, while the textbook constituted an instance of the Republican leadership’s 
stratagem for securing Turkey vis-a-vis the (European) International Society through 
creating a unified body of citizens, at the same time, it rendered myriad peoples insecure 
by narrowing the bounds of recognition of and respect for difference.
Turkey’s ‘Model Citizens’: searching for ‘Ontological 
Security’? 98
‘Ontological security’ refers to an individual’s identity and his or her ability to maintain 
who he or she is when faced with challenges.99 It may come across as counterintuitive 
to consider Turkey’s ‘model citizens’ as anything other than secure. Yet, their rigid 
responses to public expressions of ‘difference’ by their fellow citizens could be viewed 
as an instance of their search for ‘ontological security’ in the face of the latter’s avowal 
of their difference/s. This is partly because Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens’ sense of self 
was a product of a citizen imaginary that was not accepting of public expressions of 
‘difference’. Another, and perhaps more important, part of the reason was to do with the 
way in which Turkey’s ‘model citizens’ could become ‘included’, that is, through learning 
not to draw attention to (if not to forget) their own difference/s. Arguably, Turkey’s 
‘included’ citizens viewed others’ expressions of their difference/s as a challenge to 
their own sense of self. Such expressions of ‘difference’ included using languages other 
than Turkish in public places, which sparked the infamous ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ 
campaigns of the late 1920s and early 1930s.
The ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaigns were directed against the minority citizens 
and were organized and ran by non-governmental actors such as the Turkish Hearths 
Association and the Students’ Association of the Faculty of Law.100 Some citizens 
actively participated in the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaigns while some others were 
complicit in their silence.101 The first step in the campaign was taken by the Students’ 
Association of the Faculty of Law in İstanbul. On 13 January 1928, the Students’ 
Association of the Faculty of Law in İstanbul organized a campaign aimed at discouraging 
the use of languages other than Turkish in public places.102 The students put up signs that 
read, ‘We cannot say Turk to people who do not speak Turkish’.103 They also resorted to 
accosting people speaking foreign languages in public places. Those who did not speak 
Turkish were labelled as ‘fake citizens’ of the Republic.104 The Turkish Hearths 
Association organized similar campaigns in some other parts of the country.105 While 
many Kurds at the time were non-Turkish speakers, the fact that ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ 
campaigns were organized in cities and towns populated by minority citizens suggested 
that the latter were the real targets of this campaign.
The campaigns led to tension and conflict, as the participants did not only suggest that 
everyone in Turkey should speak Turkish but they also threatened some non-Turkish 
speakers in an attempt to make them speak Turkish. Some of the activists instigated court 
cases against some non-Turkish speakers, citing Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code 
about ‘insulting Turkishness’.106 Others called on their fellow citizens to ‘[e]ither speak 
Turkish or leave the country’.
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While the ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaigns were entirely in line with what the 
Republican leaders encouraged under the slogan ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’, 
the forceful approaches of the youth was eventually met by Ankara’s disapproval. As 
the campaigners began to resort to more and more violent methods, the government 
intervened and called for a halt.107
To recapitulate, Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens are peoples of myriad origins who learned 
not to draw attention to their difference/s as they were moulded into ‘model citizens’ of 
the Republic. As products of the citizen imaginary of the Republic, they, too, were in/
secured as they became increasingly less able to live with ‘difference’.
Conclusion
In Turkey’s early Republican practices, we observe both faces of citizenship as a 
‘conspiracy against the rest of the world’ (section ‘From subjecthood to citizenship: a 
process of in/securing’). First, the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, whereby Turkey and Greece 
agreed to exchange populations, was a product of citizenship practices as an ‘international 
system of population management’. As highlighted in section ‘Rethinking the literature 
on citizenship in Turkey’, the population exchange between Greece and Turkey was, 
in essence, a state-directed movement of ethnic groups, which was endorsed by the 
(European) International Society as a breakthrough attempt at conflict regulation.108 
Treaties ending the wars of this era invariably included clauses governing population 
exchanges. Groups that were considered to be (potentially) disloyal were relocated from 
one part of the state to another or were expelled from the state altogether.109 Those who 
were not forced to immigrate fled soon after.110 Turkey’s ‘excluded’ were insecured as 
part of this first aspect of citizenship as a ‘conspiracy against the rest of the world’.
The second aspect, which is more characteristic of the global South, refers to the 
postcolonial anxieties of Turkey’s early Republican leaders and the choice they made for 
constructing a unified and cohesive body of citizens. Although Turkey was not colo-
nized, the trauma that was caused by the Ottoman Empire coming to the brink of being 
dismembered by the European great powers conditioned the thinking of the early 
Republican leaders. Perhaps more significantly, the experiences and remembrances of 
late Ottoman Empire and its relations with the (European) International Society shaped 
their postcolonial anxieties.111
Going beyond binary portrayals in everyday debates (included/excluded, security/
insecurity) and mainstream IR assumptions on the relationship between security and citi-
zenship (that states provide security to their citizens and that insecurities originate from 
outside the state boundaries) allows us to consider the in/securing of myriad citizens. 
Studying the transition of people from subjecthood to citizenship in the global South as 
a process of in/securing challenges both the mainstream accounts that see the transition 
as a moment of security, but also some critical accounts that reduce it to a process of 
insecuring. Inquiring into the relationship between security and citizenship in global 
South contexts demands particular attention to ‘the international’ as well as reflexivity of 
security.
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